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Sensation Seeking and Hedge Funds
STEPHEN BROWN, YAN LU, SUGATA RAY, and MELVYN TEO⇤
Journal of Finance, forthcoming
Abstract
We show that motivated by sensation seeking, hedge fund managers who own powerful
sports cars take on more investment risk but do not deliver higher returns, resulting
in lower Sharpe ratios, information ratios, and alphas. Moreover, sensation-seeking
managers trade more frequently, actively, and unconventionally, and prefer lottery-like
stocks. We show further that some investors are themselves susceptible to sensation
seeking and that sensation-seeking investors fuel the demand for sensation-seeking man-
agers. While investors perceive sensation seekers to be less competent, they do not fully
appreciate the superior investment skills of sensation-avoiding fund managers.
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“The emerging manager who goes out and buys a fancy sports car right o↵ the bat is someone
you probably want to avoid.”
–Business Insider, February 20161
Do the personality traits of professional fund managers shape their investment behavior?
Extant academic literature on the role of personality traits in finance has focused predomi-
nantly on retail investors. Salient examples of such work include Barber and Odean (2000,
2001) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009). However, given the amount of capital that some
fund managers manage and the potential for their trading behavior to impose negative ex-
ternalities on their underlying investors, an analysis of how personality impacts trading is
arguably even more important for investment managers than for individual investors. This
paper helps fill this void by evaluating fund managers’ proclivity for sensation seeking using
novel automobile ownership data and analyzing their investment behavior.
Sensation seeking is a personality trait clinically defined as the seeking of varied, novel,
complex, and intense sensations and experiences, and the willingness to take physical, social,
legal, and financial risks for the sake of such experiences. It has been linked to the propensity
to engage in risky driving, extreme sports, substance abuse, and crime (Zuckerman (1994,
2007)).2 We show that, motivated by sensation seeking, some hedge fund managers take sub-
stantial financial and operational risks for nonpecuniary reasons unrelated to performance,
and that the incremental risk-taking ultimately hurts their investors. Our work adds to an
emerging literature on the impact of sensation seeking on retail investors (Grinblatt and
1See “Here are the biggest ‘red flags’ that keep people away from giving a new hedge fund manager
money,” Business Insider, February 18, 2016. The article further describes this as the classic “red Ferrari
syndrome.”
2While sensation seeking may imply greater risk-taking, the taking of risk does not necessarily imply
sensation seeking. The elevated risk-taking of sensation seekers is simply a by-product of their preference
for varied, novel, complex, and intense experiences. Zuckerman (2007) notes that “. . . sensation seekers do
not seek risk for its own sake. It is not the riskiness of their activities that make them rewarding. In fact,
many or most experiences sought by sensation seekers are not at all risky. Listening to rock music; partying
with interesting, stimulating people; and looking at intensely erotic or violent movies or television involve no
risk. However, other types of activities such as driving very fast, engaging in extreme sports, getting drunk
or high on drugs, and having unprotected sex with a variety of partners, do involve risk.”
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Keloharju (2009)), chief executive o cers (CEOs) (Cain and McKeon (2016) and Sunder,
Sunder, and Zhang (2017)), and households (Bochkay et al. (2018)).
The hedge fund industry is an important and interesting laboratory for exploring the
impact of sensation seeking on finance. Hedge funds collectively managed over US$3.3 trillion
in assets in 2017.3 The complex, dynamic, and relatively unconstrained strategies that hedge
fund managers employ, which often involve short sales, leverage, and derivatives, may attract
sensation seekers by satisfying their desire for varied, novel, complex, and intense experiences.
Indeed, professional traders often describe trading as addictive given the adrenaline rush
they derive from placing big wagers.4 Neuroscientists have found that in the human brain,
monetary gain stimulates the same reward circuitry as cocaine (Breiter et al. (2001)).5
Sensation seekers may also be drawn to the industry’s limited transparency and regulatory
oversight, which imply fewer constraints on trading behavior. Seemingly wary of the impact
of sensation seeking on trading behavior, some hedge fund allocators argue that the purchase
of a performance sports car or the pursuit of risky leisure activities by a manager raises red
flags about her fund (Strachman (2008)).
Prior research has used data on speeding tickets (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009)), pilot
licenses (Cain and McKeon (2016) and Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2017)), and extramarital
a↵airs (Bochkay et al. (2018)) to identify sensation seekers. By using the characteristics of
vehicles purchased, such as body style, maximum horsepower, maximum torque, passenger
volume, and safety ratings, as opposed to speeding tickets or pilot licenses, we are able to
leverage on a multiplicity and continuum of signals that increase the power of our tests.6 We
argue that, more often than not, the purchase of a powerful sports car conveys the intent
to drive in a spirited fashion and therefore signals an inclination for sensation seeking.7
3See https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/money under management.html.
4See, for example, “A disgraced trader’s bid for redemption – Alexis Stenfors got fired for lying about
losses; moving on has been hard,” Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2016.
5Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) present evidence that supports a neural basis for financial risk-taking.
6Moreover, this allows us to sidestep concerns about how travel mileage, tra c enforcement activity,
situational awareness behind the wheel, access to a good lawyer, as well as the use of radar-detecting and
laser-jamming devices can a↵ect the probability of receiving a tra c citation conditional on speeding.
7In an ideal world, we would assess hedge fund managers by using the battery of tests developed in the
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Jonah (1997) reviews the link between sensation seeking and risky driving. Conversely, we
contend that the acquisition of a practical but unexciting vehicle such as a minivan reflects
an aversion to sensation seeking.8
The empirical results are striking. We find that hedge fund managers who purchase per-
formance cars take on more investment risk than do fund managers who eschew performance
cars. Specifically, sports car drivers exhibit annualized return standard deviations that are
1.80 percentage points, or 16.61%, higher than those of nonsports car drivers. Similarly,
funds managed by drivers of high horsepower and high torque automobiles deliver more
volatile returns. Conversely, we find that managers who acquire practical but unexciting
cars take on less investment risk relative to managers who shun these cars. Minivan owners,
for example, generate annualized return standard deviations that are 1.28 percentage points,
or 11.74%, lower than do other owners. Moreover, managers who purchase cars with high
passenger volumes and excellent safety ratings also produce more stable returns.
The incremental risk-taking by sensation seekers does not benefit their clients. Buyers
of cars with pro-sensation attributes (sports car ownership, horsepower, and torque) deliver
lower Sharpe ratios and information ratios than do buyers of cars with anti-sensation at-
tributes (minivan ownership, passenger volume, and safety rating). For example, sports car
owners generate annualized Sharpe ratios and information ratios that are on average 0.39
and 0.29 lower, respectively, than those generated by other car owners. Indeed, we find
that sensation seekers harvest lower alphas than do sensation avoiders. After adjusting for
co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors and controlling for other factors
that drive fund performance, sports car drivers underperform nonsports car drivers by 2.92%
per year while minivan drivers outperform nonminivan drivers by 3.22% per year.
The disinhibition and boredom-aversion of sensation seekers imply that they may cut
corners on compliance and other record-keeping functions, leading to higher operational
psychology literature to gauge sensation seeking (see Zuckerman (2007)). However, as Brown et al. (2012)
have shown, hedge fund managers may not always tell the truth.
8Articles in the popular press that describe minivans as dowdy, stodgy, and uncool lend support to this
view. See, for example, “Operation: minivan,” Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2003.
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risk, which hurts their clients. In line with this view, we find that performance car drivers
are more likely to terminate their funds, even after controlling for their elevated financial
risk. They are also more likely to disclose regulatory actions as well as civil and criminal
violations on their Form ADVs. Moreover, performance car owners exhibit higher w-Scores, a
univariate measure of operational risk exposure (Brown et al. (2009)). These results suggest
that sensation-seeking managers may be more predisposed to fraud (Dimmock and Gerken
(2012)).
We show that the desire for varied, novel, complex, and intense experiences drives trading
behavior amongst those hedge fund managers we identify as sensation seekers. Relative to
other car owners, owners of cars with pro-sensation attributes turn over their stock portfolios
more often, load up more on nonindex stocks, increase their Active Share vis-a`-vis the S&P
500 (Cremers and Petajisto (2009)), exhibit lower R2s with respect to the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) risk factors, engage in more distinctive strategies (Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012)), and
prefer lottery-like stocks with high past daily returns (Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011)).
The opposite holds for owners of cars with anti-sensation attributes.
Why do sensation-seeking hedge funds persist despite delivering inferior performance and
exhibiting greater operational risk? Our results indicate that some hedge fund investors are
themselves susceptible to sensation seeking. In line with the sensation-seeking view, fund
of hedge funds (FoF) managers who purchase sports cars tend to take on more risk while
FoF managers who purchase minivans tend to take on less risk. Moreover, sensation-seeking
FoFs load positively on sensation-seeking hedge funds while sensation-avoiding FoFs load
negatively on sensation-seeking hedge funds. These results suggest that sensation-seeking
investors fuel the demand for sensation-seeking hedge fund managers.
As drivers of capital to sensation-seeking hedge funds, sensation-seeking investors also
shape the flow-performance relationship of these funds. Consistent with the view that
sensation-seeking investors trade more actively by chasing fund performance (Agarwal,
Green, and Ren (2018)), we find that sensation-seeking hedge funds attract capital that
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is more sensitive to past performance than that attracted to sensation-avoiding hedge funds.
Moreover, in keeping with the view that sensation seeking constitutes an agency cost in
investment management, we find that fund managers are less likely to engage in sensation
seeking when their incentives are more aligned with those of their investors, for example,
when they co-invest personal capital alongside their limited partners. Finally, by leverag-
ing on the framework of Berk and Green (2004), we argue that while investors perceive
sensation-seeking fund managers to be less competent, they do not fully appreciate the su-
perior investment skills of sensation-avoiding fund managers.
The results suggest that some fund managers take risks for intrinsic and nonpecuniary
reasons that are related to sensation seeking. This paper thus contributes to the literature on
hedge fund financial risks, which has hitherto concentrated on extrinsic and pecuniary reasons
for bearing risk. Examples of such work include Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Agarwal and
Naik (2004), Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2004), Aragon (2007), Sadka (2010), Buraschi, Kosowski,
and Trojani (2014), and Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014) on risk premia.
This paper also deepens our understanding of the sources of hedge fund operational risk.
Work in this area has focused on assessing operational risk and its impact (Brown et al. (2008,
2009, 2012)) or predicting hedge fund fraud, a particular type of operational risk (Dimmock
and Gerken (2012) and Bollen and Pool (2012)). We show that innate personality traits such
as sensation seeking can have implications for operational risk. Moreover, by uncovering a
common driver of both operational and financial risk, we help rationalize Brown et al.’s
(2009) finding of a significant and positive interaction between the two types of risk.
The findings resonate with work on hedge fund performance. This literature finds
that motivated (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009)), geographically proximate (Teo (2009)),
emerging (Aggarwal and Jorion (2010)), low R2 (Titman and Tiu (2011)), and distinctive
(Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012)) hedge fund managers outperform. We show that those who
eschew sensation seeking also outperform.
Our work also echoes research in corporate finance on the influence of CEO personal
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characteristics such as personal leverage (Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012)), marital
status (Roussanov and Savor (2014)), military experience (Benmelech and Frydman (2015)),
frugality (Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2015)), and early life experience (Malmendier, Tate,
and Yan (2011) and Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau (2017)) on corporate outcomes. While those
studies also show that managers’ personal characteristics drive risk-taking behavior in their
professional lives, our hedge fund analysis sheds additional light on the types of risk that are
taken and the consequences of sensation-seeking behavior.
Lastly, the results enrich the behavioral finance literature. In particular, we complement
work by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009), who analyze the impact of sensation seeking on
the trading frequency of Finnish retail investors but do not investigate risk.9 Unlike those
authors, we focus on the nonpecuniary financial and operational risks of professional hedge
fund managers. Nonpecuniary risk-taking benefits sensation-seeking fund managers at the
expense of their underlying investors. Also, unlike Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009), we show
that sensation seekers trade more actively (by purchasing nonindex stocks and exhibiting a
higher Active Share) and unconventionally, have a stronger preference for lottery-like stocks,
and lose more from trading per se than do nonsensation seekers. Barber and Odean (2001)
link gender to trading activity and excessive trading. Since sensation seeking is more preva-
lent among males, our finding that sensation seekers trade more excessively bolsters the
argument of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) that some of the findings of Barber and Odean
(2001) may be ascribed to sensation seeking.
In general, we contribute to the nascent literature on sensation seeking in finance in the
following ways. First, we show that the incremental risk-taking of sensation seekers extends
9Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) principally use a discrete variable–the number of speeding tickets–to
capture sensation seeking while Cain and McKeon (2016) and Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2017) use a
binary variable–whether a CEO has a pilot’s license–as a proxy for sensation seeking. In contrast, we
use multiple, and often continuous, vehicle attributes to proxy for sensation seeking. We note that in an
untabulated robustness test (pp. 575), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) also use an indicator variable–sports
car ownership–to gauge sensation seeking. They define sports cars as vehicles with power-to-weight ratios in
excess of 125 kW per metric ton (based on our conversations with Matti Keloharju). We define sports cars
as two-door coupes, two-door convertibles, or two-door hatchbacks, and we use sports car ownership as one
of our three pro-sensation variables. However, we also analyze the continuous variable–vehicle horsepower-
to-weight ratio–as an alternative proxy for sensation seeking and obtain very similar results.
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beyond financial risk into the operational risk arena. Second, we link sensation seeking to the
preference for active trading, unconventional strategies, and lottery-like stocks. Third, we
document a novel sensation-avoidance e↵ect via the anti-sensation vehicle attributes that we
analyze. Fourth, we find that sensation seeking is self-sustaining in the financial ecosystem.
Fifth, we demonstrate that sensation seeking can shape the hedge fund flow-performance
relationship. Finally, we show that incentive alignment can ameliorate the sensation-seeking
tendencies of hedge fund managers.
In our work, we carefully consider several alternative explanations, including reverse
causality, sample selection, endogeneity, gender, social status (Pi↵ et al. (2012)), peer e↵ects,
frugality (Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2015)), marital status (Love (2010) and Roussanov and
Savor (2014)), biological age, and skewness preference, and find that each of these possible
explanations is unlikely to drive our findings. Still, it is not possible to fully rule out all other
stories or mechanisms. One caveat, therefore, is that our findings may be driven by some
omitted variable that we have not controlled for or that we have not adequately adjusted for
in our tests. The findings in this paper should thus be considered in light of this limitation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data and
methodology. Section II reports the empirical results. Section III explores the relationship
between investors and hedge funds in the context of sensation seeking. Section IV examines
alternative explanations and reports results of robustness tests. Section V concludes.
I. Data and Methodology
We hand-collect hedge fund manager vehicle purchase records and details from various
websites. VIN Place (vin.place) provides free access to new vehicle purchase records from
2006 to 2012. The data are culled from dealerships and auto insurance companies, and
capture the vast majority of new vehicle purchases in the U.S.10 We search for manager car
10There are roughly 90 million records in the VIN Place data set from 2006 to 2012. This lines up with
the roughly 90 million new car sales during that period reported by Autodata. See “US car sales set record
7
purchases on VIN Place using a name search, which we further refine by matching the city
and state of the car buyer with the location of the hedge fund management company. When
we observe multiple matching car buyers based on a name, city, and state match, we drop
that observation from the sample. From VIN Place, we obtain basic vehicle information
including make, model, year, and vehicle identification number (VIN). Vehicle make de-
notes the automaker, for example, Chevrolet, while vehicle model denotes the specific model
produced, for example, Corvette.
To obtain additional information, we search on Autocheck (www.autocheck.com) with
the VINs obtained from VIN Place. Autocheck provides car details such as trim levels and
body style. Vehicle trim levels specify the exact variant within each car model. For example,
trim levels for the Porsche 911 include Carrera S Coupe, GT3, Turbo, etc. Vehicle body
style provides a brief description of the body style of the vehicle, for example, hatchback
two-door, coupe two-door, sports van, etc. Finally, we obtain car details such as maximum
horsepower, maximum torque, passenger volume, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
(IIHS) average safety rating, and price (Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price or MSRP
during year of sale) from cars.com (www.cars.com), cars-data (www.cars-data.com), and
the IIHS (www.iihs.org).11 To avoid look-ahead bias, we relate car purchases to manager
investment behavior after the purchase date, where purchase date data are obtained from
Autocheck.
We categorize the cars in our sample into sports cars, minivans, and other cars based
on body style. According to Merriam Webster, a sports car is a “low small usually two-
passenger automobile designed for quick response, easy maneuverability, and high-speed
driving,” while a minivan is a “small passenger van.” Therefore, we classify all vehicles
in 2015,” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2016. However, we note that VIN Place has an opt-out policy and
as such any individual can request that their car purchase records be removed. It is therefore possible that
our search will miss some managers who have opted out of the data set.
11IIHS evaluates a car’s crashworthiness based on five dimensions: (i) small front overlap, (ii) moderate
front overlap, (iii) side, (iv) roof strength, and (v) head restraints and seats. Along each dimension, the
crashworthiness of the car is rated as good, acceptable, marginal, or poor. To compute the IIHS average
safety rating, we quantify the crashworthiness score using the rubric poor = 1, marginal = 2, acceptable =
3, and good = 4, and take the average across the five dimensions. See http://www.iihs.org/iihs.
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with the “coupe two-door,” “convertible two-door,” or “hatchback two-door” body style as
sports cars and all vehicles with the “passenger van,” “sports van,” or “extended sports
van” body style as minivans.12 We define pro-sensation vehicle attributes as the indicator
variable for sports car, maximum horsepower, and maximum torque. Conversely, we define
anti-sensation vehicle attributes as the indicator variable for minivan, passenger volume, and
IIHS average safety rating.13 We include maximum horsepower and torque as pro-sensation
attributes to address concerns that some vehicles classified as sports cars based on body
style are too underpowered to be considered bonafide sports cars. Passenger volume and
safety rating are included as anti-sensation attributes since spacious and safe cars are often
perceived as dull.
We evaluate the impact of sensation seeking on hedge funds using monthly net-of-fee
returns and assets under management (AUM) data for live and dead hedge funds reported
in the Lipper TASS, Morningstar, Hedge Fund Research (HFR), and BarclayHedge data sets
from January 1990 to December 2015. Since VIN Place only includes information on vehicles
purchased from 2006 to 2012, we focus on the January 2004 to December 2015 sample period,
which allows us to examine the risk-seeking behavior of hedge fund managers post-vehicle
purchase.
In our fund universe, we have a total of 49,672 hedge funds, of which 28,810 are live
funds and 20,862 are dead funds. However, due to concerns that funds with multiple share
classes could cloud the analysis, we exclude duplicate share classes from the sample. This
leaves a total of 43,195 hedge funds, of which 25,461 are live funds and 17,734 are dead
funds. The funds are roughly evenly split between Lipper TASS, Morningstar, HFR, and
12In our sample, examples of sports cars include the Ferrari 458 Italia (coupe two-door), Aston Martin DBS
(coupe two-door), Nissan GTR (coupe two-door), Lotus Elise (convertible two-door), and Volkswagen GTI
(hatchback two-door), while examples of minivans include the Toyota Sienna (sports van), Honda Odyssey
(sports van), Chrysler Town and Country (sports van), Volkswagen Routan (passenger van), and Chevrolet
Uplander (extended sports van).
13Our baseline findings are robust to using alternative pro-sensation variables such as 0-60 mph time, 0-60
mph quintile rank, or horsepower-to-weight ratio and alternative anti-sensation variables such as miles per
gallon (city), miles per gallon (highway), or cargo volume. The results are also robust to demeaning the
vehicle attributes by model year.
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BarclayHedge. While 9,675 funds appear in multiple databases, many funds belong to only
one database. Specifically, 10,267, 6,141, 9,264, and 7,848 funds are unique to the Lipper
TASS, Morningstar, HFR, and BarclayHedge databases, respectively. This highlights the
advantage of obtaining data from more than one source.
During the period that corresponds to the VIN Place purchase data, that is, 2006 to 2012,
there are 5,479 hedge fund managers in our sample, of which 4,505 are based in the U.S. In
total, we are able to match 1,774 vehicles to 1,144 of these U.S.-based hedge fund managers,
of which 163 are sports cars and 101 are minivans. We treat multiple cars purchased by
the same manager as independent observations. Inferences do not change when we limit the
sample to fund managers who purchase only one car. Table I provides summary statistics
for the matched vehicles. We find significant heterogeneity in the body style, horsepower,
torque, passenger volume, safety rating, and price of the vehicles bought by fund managers.
[Insert Table I here]
Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), we classify funds into four broad investment
styles: Security Selection, Multi-Process, Directional Trader, and Relative Value. Security
Selection funds take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued securities, re-
spectively. Usually, they take positions in equity markets. Multi-Process funds employ
multiple strategies that take advantage of significant events, such as spin-o↵s, mergers and
acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional
Trader funds bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities,
and bonds in the futures and cash markets. Relative Value funds take positions on spread
relations between prices of financial assets and seek to minimize market exposure.
Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Fung and Hsieh (2009)). These biases
stem from the fact that inclusion in a hedge fund database is voluntary. As a result, there is
self-selection bias. For instance, when a fund is listed on a database, it often includes data
prior to the listing date. Because successful funds have a strong incentive to list in an e↵ort
to attract capital, these backfilled returns tend to be higher than the nonbackfilled returns.
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To alleviate concerns about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst
(2014) and others, we rerun the tests after removing all return observations that have been
backfilled prior to the fund listing date.
Throughout this paper, we model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess return on the Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as the
di↵erence between the Russell 2000 and S&P 500 stock indexes; the yield spread of the U.S.
10-year Treasury bond over the three-month Treasury bill, adjusted for the duration of the
10-year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s BAA bonds over
the 10-year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY); and the
excess returns on portfolios of lookback straddle options on currencies (PTFSFX), commodi-
ties (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are constructed to replicate the maximum
possible return from trend-following strategies on their respective underlying assets.14 Fung
and Hsieh (2004) show that these seven factors have considerable power to explain hedge
fund returns.
II. Empirical Results
A. Financial Risk and Performance
To explore the impact of sensation seeking on fund risk-taking behavior, we first group
hedge funds by the pro-sensation automobile attributes. Specifically, we sort funds based on
whether the manager purchased (i) a sports car or nonsports car, (ii) a high or low horsepower
car, and (iii) a high or low torque car. We classify an automobile as a high horsepower car if
its maximum horsepower is at or above the median. Similarly, we categorize an automobile
as a high torque car if its maximum torque is at or above the median. Table II reports
14David Hsieh kindly supplied these risk factors. The trend-following factors can be downloaded from
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/ dah7/DataLibrary/TF-Fac.xls.
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the average fund risk and idiosyncratic risk post-automobile purchase for each group of
funds. Fund risk is the standard deviation of fund returns while idiosyncratic risk is the
standard deviation of fund residuals from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model.
Risk and idiosyncratic risk are estimated over each nonoverlapping 24-month period post-
vehicle purchase. We analyze idiosyncratic risk, as opposed to systematic risk, as we are
principally interested in exploring nonpecuniary risk-taking.15 For each group, Table II also
reports the average monthly fund returns, alpha, and flow, as well as fund attributes such
as management fee, performance fee, lock-up period, redemption period, and AUM.
The risk measures reported in Table II indicate that hedge fund managers who purchase
performance cars take on more risk than do other hedge fund managers. On an annualized
basis, sports car drivers take on 1.80 percentage points more risk than do nonsports car
drivers, high horsepower car owners deliver returns that are 1.14 percentage points more
volatile than those of low horsepower car owners, and the returns of managers with high
torque cars are 1.25 percentage points more volatile than those of managers with low torque
cars. These results are economically significant. The 1.80 percentage point spread in risk
between sports car and nonsports car drivers represents a 16.61% increase in volatility over
that of nonsports car drivers. Moreover, for each sort, the spread in risk is statistically
significant at the 1% level. These results are broadly consistent with the sensation-seeking
view. Inferences remain qualitatively unchanged when we analyze idiosyncratic risk or when
we perform quintile sorts on horsepower and torque and examine the spread in risk between
the extreme quintiles.
[Insert Tables II and III here]
The other fund attributes, with the exception of fund AUM, do not appear to exhibit
statistically reliable variation across groups. Fund managers who purchase performance cars
tend to manage smaller funds. Therefore, if managers who run smaller funds also have
15The results reported in Panel A of Table IAI in the Internet Appendix, available in the online version
of this article on the Journal of Finance website, indicate that managers of vehicles with pro-sensation
attributes do not take on more systematic risk.
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greater risk appetites, fund size may explain why we find that performance car owners take
on more risk. To address such concerns, we estimate the following multivariate regression
on fund risk:
RISKim+23,m = ↵ +  1PROSENSATIONim 1 +  2RETURNm 1,m 24
+  3MGTFEEi +  4PERFFEEi +  5LOCKUPi +  6LEV ERAGEi
+  7AGEim 1 +  8REDEMPTIONi +  9log(FUNDSIZEim 1)
+
X
k
 k10STRATEGYDUM
k
i +
X
l
 l11Y EARDUM
l
m + ✏im, (1)
where RISK is the standard deviation of fund returns estimated over 24 months from month
m to month m+23, PROSENSATION is a placeholder for the pro-sensation variables de-
rived from automobile ownership data, RETURN is the fund return averaged over 24 months,
MGTFEE is management fee, PERFFEE is performance fee, LOCKUP is lock-up period,
LEVERAGE is leverage indicator, AGE is fund age since inception, REDEMPTION is
redemption period, log(FUNDSIZE ) is the natural logarithm of fund AUM, STRATEGY-
DUM is the fund strategy dummy, and YEARDUM is the year dummy, where the year
corresponds to that of month m. We estimate three sets of regressions that correspond to
the pro-sensation variables (i) SPORT, an indicator variable that takes a value of one for
sports cars and zero otherwise, (ii) POWER, the maximum horsepower of the car purchased,
and (iii) TORQUE, the maximum torque of the car purchased. We also estimate analogous
regressions on fund idiosyncratic risk. The regressions are estimated for fund risk evalu-
ated over all nonoverlapping 24-month periods post-vehicle purchase.16 Inferences remain
unchanged when we evaluate risk and idiosyncratic risk over 36 months as opposed to 24
months.
16We do so because sensation seeking is a durable personality trait (Zuckerman (2007)). We obtain similar
inferences when we limit the regression analysis to the first 24 months post-vehicle purchase or when we
limit the regression analysis to the vehicle ownership period, using Autocheck vehicle ownership data. Since
Autocheck vehicle ownership data are not available for all funds, the latter analysis reduces the sample size
by 28.7%.
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Columns (1) to (3) of Table III report the coe cient estimates from the regressions on
fund risk.17 The coe cient estimates on SPORT, POWER, and TORQUE indicate that
after controlling for other variables that may explain fund risk-taking, hedge fund managers
who purchase performance cars take on more risk than do other fund managers. Specifically,
managers who acquire sports cars exhibit annualized return standard deviations that are
2.30 percentage points higher than those of managers who eschew sports cars. Similarly, one-
standard-deviation increases in maximum horsepower and maximum torque are associated
with increases in annualized fund risk of 1.28 percentage points and 1.13 percentage points,
respectively. These results are qualitatively unchanged when we evaluate idiosyncratic risk
(see columns (7) to (9) of Table III). The coe cient estimates on the other fund variables are
largely statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, we do find that funds that charge
higher management fees tend to take on greater idiosyncratic risk. In addition, smaller funds
and funds that use greater leverage also take on more risk.
To investigate the relationship between sensation avoidance and investment risk, we first
sort funds based on the anti-sensation vehicle attributes. In Table II, we find that managers
who acquire practical but unexciting cars take on lower investment risk. For example,
minivan owners exhibit annualized standard deviations that are 1.28 percentage points lower
than those of other owners.18 This represents an economically meaningful 11.74% reduction
in risk. Inferences do not change when we perform quintile sorts on passenger volume and
safety rating and examine the spread in risk between the extreme quintiles.
Next, we estimate multivariate regressions on risk that are analogous to equation (1)
but with ANTISENSATION in place of PROSENSATION, where ANTISENSATION is a
placeholder for the anti-sensation variables derived from automobile ownership data. We
17The number of observations for each RISK and IDIORISK regression pair can vary depending on the
pro- or anti-sensation variable used as the independent variable of interest. This is because even though, as
per Table II, the number of funds with observations for each pro- or anti-sensation variable is the same (save
for SAFETY, for which there are fewer funds with observations), the number of monthly returns reported
by each fund post-purchase, and therefore the number of RISK and IDIORISK observations, can vary.
18While the spread in annualized standard deviation between minivan and nonminivan owners for the
sort is statistically indistinguishable from zero, it is larger and statistically significant at the 1% level in the
multivariate regression analysis that follows.
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estimate three sets of regressions that correspond to the anti-sensation variables (i) MINI-
VAN, an indicator variable that takes a value of one for minivans and zero otherwise, (ii)
SPACE, the passenger volume of the car purchased, and (iii) SAFETY, the IIHS average
safety rating for the car purchased. We also estimate regressions on idiosyncratic risk.
The results reported in columns (4) to (6) of Table III indicate that, after controlling for
other factors, hedge fund managers who eschew sensation seeking tend to take on less risk.
In particular, minivan drivers deliver returns that are 1.91 percentage points per annum less
volatile than those of other drivers. Likewise, a one-standard-deviation increase in passenger
volume translates into a 1.04 percentage point per annum reduction in risk, while a one-unit
improvement in the average IIHS safety rating engenders a 1.36 percentage point per annum
reduction in risk. The results for MINIVAN are not driven by the presence of sports cars
amongst nonminivans. Inferences do not change when we include SPORT and MINIVAN
in the same risk regression.
The results from Table II suggest that the incremental risk-taking by performance car
buyers does not translate into higher returns. This raises the question of whether the
heightened risk of performance car buyers results in lower Sharpe and information ratios.
To address this question, we estimate multivariate regressions on Sharpe ratio (SHARPE )
and information ratio (INFORMATION ) that are analogous to equation (1). The variable
SHARPE is the average fund excess return divided by the standard deviation of fund returns
estimated over 24 months, and the variable INFORMATION is the fund information ratio or
average monthly abnormal return divided by the standard deviation of fund residuals over 24
months. Fund abnormal returns and residuals are determined relative to the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) model. Both SHARPE and INFORMATION are computed for all nonoverlapping
24-month periods post-vehicle purchase.
[Insert Table IV here]
The results reported in Panels A and B of Table IV indicate that managers who purchase
vehicles with pro-sensation attributes deliver lower Sharpe and information ratios. In partic-
15
ular, sports car owners deliver annualized Sharpe and information ratios that are on average
0.38 and 0.33 lower, respectively, than those of other car owners. Conversely, managers who
purchase vehicles with anti-sensation attributes generate higher Sharpe and information ra-
tios. Specifically, minivan drivers generate annualized Sharpe and information ratios that
are on average 0.54 and 0.40 higher, respectively, than those of other drivers. These results
are economically meaningful, given that the annualized Sharpe ratio and information ratio
of the average fund in our sample is 0.84 and 0.23, respectively. We note that although
the coe cient estimate on MINIVAN in the information ratio regression is not statistically
distinguishable from zero, those on SPACE and SAFETY are.
In our analysis, we focus on Sharpe and information ratios as they are invariant to fund
leverage. Variation in fund leverage is a concern given the propensity for sensation seekers to
take greater financial risk. Nonetheless, we also estimate analogous multivariate regressions
on monthly fund alpha. We define monthly fund alpha as the monthly fund abnormal return
relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model, where the factor loadings are
estimated over the past 24 months. To account for cross-fund correlation in residuals, we
cluster the standard errors by month (as well as by fund). The results reported in Panel C
of Table IV indicate that, after adjusting for risk and controlling for other factors that can
drive performance, sports car drivers underperform nonsports car drivers by 2.92% per year,
while minivan drivers outperform nonminivan drivers by 3.22% per year. Furthermore, the
coe cient estimates on the pro-sensation variables are all negative and statistically significant
at the 1% level, while those on the anti-sensation variables are all positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level (save for that on SAFETY ).
B. Operational Risk
If sensation seeking drives the relationship between performance car ownership and risk,
we should expect the disinhibition and nonpecuniary risk-taking to extend beyond hedge
fund strategies to the management of the fund itself. In this section, we explore di↵erences
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between the operational risk attributes of managers who purchase performance cars and those
of managers who eschew performance cars by analyzing the cross-sectional determinants of
fund termination and other operational risk metrics, controlling for financial risk.
Our analysis of fund termination is motivated by Brown et al. (2009), who find that
operational risk is more significant than financial risk in explaining fund failure. To explore
the relationship between performance car ownership and fund termination, we estimate logit
regressions on an indicator variable for fund termination with the set of independent variables
used in the equation (1) regressions, augmented with fund returns and flows calculated over
the past 24 months. Because we are interested in measuring operational risk exposure, we
also control for financial risk measured over the same time frame. The indicator variable
TERMINATION takes a value of one when a fund stops reporting returns for that month
and states that it has liquidated, and a value of zero otherwise. We limit the analysis to
TASS and HFR funds since only TASS and HFR provide the reason a fund stopped reporting
returns.
[Insert Table V here]
The results reported in Panel A of Table V indicate that, controlling for other factors that
can explain fund termination including financial risk exposure, performance car buyers are
more likely to terminate their funds. The marginal e↵ects from the logit regressions suggest
that sports car drivers are 4.70% more likely to terminate their funds in any given year
than are nonsports car drivers. Similarly, a one-standard-deviation increase in maximum
horsepower (torque) is associated with a 1.95% (1.02%) increase in the probability of fund
termination in any given year. These results are economically meaningful given that the
unconditional probability of fund termination in any given year is 6.04%. Panel A of Table
V also reports results from analogous regressions on fund termination with the anti-sensation
variables. We find that fund managers who own practical but unexciting cars are less likely
to terminate their funds. As a robustness test, we estimate semiparametric Cox hazard
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rate regressions on fund termination. As shown in Panel B of Table V, inferences remain
unchanged when we model fund survival in this way.
Sensation seeking may lead to deviations from expected standards of business conduct
that could precipitate regulatory action and lawsuits, as well as civil and even criminal
violations. These events must be reported as Item 11 disclosures on Form ADV.19 To explore
the relationship between sensation seeking and violations of expected standards of business
conduct, we estimate multivariate logit regressions on an indicator variable for Form ADV
violations. The indicator variable VIOLATION takes a value of one after a fund manager
reports on her Form ADV in the 24-month period post-vehicle purchase that she has been
associated with an Item 11 Form ADV disclosure, and a value of zero otherwise.20 Form
ADV includes disclosure on all regulatory actions taken against the fund as well as lawsuits
and civil and criminal violations linked to the investment advisor over the past 10 years.
Panel C of Table V reports the coe cient estimates and marginal e↵ects from the logit
regressions on VIOLATION. The independent variables that we employ are analogous to
those used in the baseline equation (1) regressions. Consistent with the sensation-seeking
view, we find that hedge fund managers who purchase performance cars are also more likely
to report on their Form ADVs that they have been associated with past regulatory, civil,
and criminal violations. The coe cient estimates on SPORT, POWER, and TORQUE are
all positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The marginal e↵ects indicate that
owners of sports cars are 18.4 percentage points more likely to report a violation on their
Form ADVs than are owners of other cars. Conversely, managers who own minivans are 18.6
19For a brief period in 2006, all hedge funds domiciled in the U.S. and meeting certain minimal conditions
had to register as financial advisors and file the Form ADV, which provides basic information about the
operational characteristics of the fund. This requirement was dropped in June 2006, but since that date
most hedge funds have continued to voluntarily file this form, and since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act
all hedge funds with AUM over $100M have been required to file this form.
20To minimize look-ahead bias, we focus on the set of funds that did not report a Form ADV disclosure
prior to vehicle purchase. We do so because Form ADV violations are reported over a 10-year lookback
window. Therefore, if we included all Form ADV disclosures reported after the purchase of the car but
within 10 years of the car purchase date, it would not be clear whether the violations took place after or
before the vehicle purchase. Only in situations where funds did not report a Form ADV disclosure prior to
vehicle purchase can we be sure that the violations reported after vehicle purchase took place post-vehicle
purchase.
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percentage points less likely to report a violation on their Form ADVs.
To further investigate the relationship between sensation seeking and operational risk,
we compute fund w-Score, an operational risk instrument derived from fund performance,
volatility, age, size, fee structure, and other fund characteristics that Brown et al. (2009)
show is useful for predicting hedge fund failures.21 We then estimate regressions on OMEGA
or fund w-Score with the pro- and anti-sensation vehicle attributes as independent variables.
The control variables that we employ are analogous to those used in the baseline equation
(1) regressions. The regressions are estimated for OMEGA evaluated over all nonoverlapping
24-month periods post-vehicle purchase. The results reported in Panel D of Table V support
the view that sensation seekers exhibit greater operational risk.
C. Trading Behavior
Sensation seekers are driven by their desire for varied, novel, complex, and intense ex-
periences. Therefore, to the extent that performance car ownership reveals a propensity for
sensation seeking, we should observe that performance car buyers trade more often, purchase
more unusual stocks, and engage in more unconventional strategies.
To investigate this conjecture, we construct five trading behavior measures from
hedge fund 13-F long-only quarterly stock holdings and reported returns: TURNOVER,
NONSPRATIO, ACTIVESHARE, NRSQUARED, and DISTINCTIVENESS. The measure
TURNOVER is the annualized turnover of a hedge fund manager’s stock portfolio, NON-
SPRATIO is the ratio of the number of non-S&P 500 index stocks bought in a quarter to
the total number of new positions in the quarter, ACTIVESHARE is Active Share or the
fraction of fund portfolio holdings that di↵er from the S&P 500, as in Cremers and Petajisto
(2009), NRSQUARED is one minus the R2 from the regression of fund excess returns against
21The w-Score is based on a canonical correlation analysis that relates a vector of responses from Form ADV
to a vector of fund characteristics in the TASS database, across all hedge funds that registered as investment
advisors in the first quarter of 2006. The fund characteristics used include fund manager personal capital.
See Table III in Brown et al. (2009) for the list of TASS fund characteristics used. Since only TASS provides
information on fund manager personal capital, we compute the w-Score only for TASS funds.
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the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, and DISTINCTIVENESS is one minus the sample
correlation of a fund’s return with the average return of all funds belonging to the same
investment style, as in Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012). The trading behavior measures are
defined such that an increase in any of them represents a more active (NONSPRATIO and
ACTIVESHARE ) or unconventional (NRSQUARED and DISTINCTIVENESS ) portfolio.
We compute the trading behavior measures for funds sorted by the pro- and anti-sensation
attributes and evaluate the spreads between di↵erent groups of funds.
The results reported in Table VI indicate that, consistent with the sensation-seeking
view, owners of cars with pro-sensation qualities trade more often, purchase more nonindex
stocks, increase their Active Share vis-a`-vis the S&P 500, exhibit lower R2s relative to the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model, and engage in more distinctive strategies. The
reverse holds for owners of cars with anti-sensation qualities.
[Insert Table VI here]
According to Barber and Odean (2000, 2001), overconfidence is associated with both
higher turnover and excessive trading in financial markets. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009)
argue that, by driving turnover amongst individual investors, sensation seeking can explain
some of Barber and Odean’s (2000, 2001) findings. Can sensation seeking also help explain
excessive trading? To address this question, we follow Barber and Odean (2000, 2001)
and define EXCESSIVETRADING as the di↵erence between the return that quarter of the
portfolio of stocks held by the fund at the end of the prior year and the return that same
quarter of the actual portfolio of stocks held by the fund. The results reported in Table VI
indicate that sensation seekers are more likely to trade excessively. That is, trading hurts the
performance of sensation seekers more than it does the performance of nonsensation seekers.
We next examine whether sensation seekers prefer lottery-like stocks. Bali, Cakici, and
Whitelaw (2011) argue that stocks with high maximum daily returns over the past month
(MAX) capture investor preference for lottery-like stocks. The extreme positive daily returns
of lottery-like stocks may satisfy sensation seekers’ preference for intense experiences. To
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address this question, we define LOTTERY as the maximum daily stock return over the
past month (or MAX) averaged across stocks held by the fund, and test for di↵erences in
LOTTERY between groups of fund managers sorted by the pro- and anti-sensation vehicle
attributes. The results reported in Table VI reveal that sensation seekers are drawn to
lottery-like stocks. Inferences remain unchanged when we use the Kumar (2009) definition
for lottery-like stocks instead.22
III. Hedge Fund Investors and Sensation Seeking
Why do investors subscribe to hedge funds managed by sensation-seeking managers given
their lower information ratios and higher operational risks? One possibility is that investors
themselves are susceptible to sensation seeking, and sensation-seeking investors invest in
sensation-seeking hedge funds. In this section, we explore this hypothesis with data on
FoFs. We also test the implications of our findings on the flow-performance sensitivity of
hedge funds, evaluate the association between incentive alignment and sensation seeking, and
examine investor perceptions of sensation-seeking versus sensation-avoiding fund managers.23
A. Demand for Sensation-Seeking Hedge Funds
First, we test whether some hedge fund investors are themselves susceptible to sensation
seeking. Toward that end, we reestimate our baseline cross-sectional risk regressions on our
sample of FoF managers. If some investors are prone to sensation seeking, we should find that
our baseline results on risk extend to FoF managers as well. The results reported in Table
VII indicate that controlling for other factors, FoFs managed by performance car owners
tend to take on more risk and idiosyncratic risk in their hedge fund portfolios than do other
FoFs. Conversely, FoFs managed by owners of practical but unexciting cars tend to take on
22We also estimate multivariate regressions on the trading behavior measures using the same set of controls
as in equation (1). As shown in Table IAII in the Internet Appendix, the trading behavior results remain
qualitatively unchanged.
23We thank Wei Xiong for encouraging us to expand our work in this direction.
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less risk and idiosyncratic risk than do other FoFs. In particular, FoFs managed by sports
car drivers exhibit annualized return standard deviations that are on average 6.71% higher
than those exhibited by FoFs managed by other drivers while FoFs managed by minivan
owners exhibit annualized return standard deviations that are on average 4.78% lower than
those exhibited by FoFs managed by other drivers. These results indicate that some hedge
fund investors are themselves susceptible to sensation seeking.
[Insert Tables VII and VIII here]
Next, we construct portfolios of hedge funds and FoFs based on vehicle ownership. The
sensation-seeking hedge fund portfolio is the average return of all hedge fund managers that
previously bought a sports car. The sensation-avoiding hedge fund portfolio is the average
return of all hedge fund managers that previously bought a minivan. The sensation-neutral
hedge fund portfolio is the average return of all hedge fund managers that previously pur-
chased vehicles that were neither sports cars nor minivans. The sensation-seeking, -avoiding,
and -neutral FoF portfolios are defined analogously.
To test whether sensation seeking by investors influences the demand for sensation-seeking
hedge funds, we estimate time-series regressions on the excess returns of these FoF portfolios,
where the excess returns of the three hedge fund portfolios are used as independent vari-
ables. The coe cient estimates reported in Panel A of Table VIII indicate that sensation-
seeking FoFs load positively and significantly (at the 1% level) on sensation-seeking hedge
funds, while sensation-avoiding FoFs load negatively and significantly (at the 5% level) on
sensation-seeking hedge funds. The spread between the sensation-seeking and -avoiding FoF
portfolios also loads positive and significantly (at the 1% level) on the sensation-seeking
hedge fund portfolio. These results suggest that sensation seeking drives investor prefer-
ence for sensation-seeking hedge funds. Interestingly, the results also indicate that sensation
avoidance does not fuel investor demand for sensation-avoiding hedge funds. While the
spread between the sensation-seeking and -avoiding FoF portfolios loads negatively on the
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sensation-avoiding hedge fund portfolio, that loading is statistically indistinguishable from
zero at the 5% level.
One concern with our analysis is that since we have not controlled for co-variation with
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors, the results may be driven by potentially similar risk factor
loadings of sensation-seeking FoFs and hedge funds. To address this concern, we reestimate
the time-series regressions after controlling for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven factors. The coe cient estimates reported in Panel B of Table VIII indicate that the
spread between the sensation-seeking and -avoiding FoF portfolios still loads positively and
significantly on the sensation-seeking hedge fund portfolio after accounting for risk.
Diversification may be another reason some investors gravitate toward sensation-seeking
fund managers. Consistent with this view, the findings in Table VI suggest that sensation
seekers load less on index stocks. To further test the diversification hypothesis, we evaluate
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factor loadings on the spread between the sensation-seeking and
-avoiding hedge fund portfolios. The results indicate that sensation-seeking hedge funds
load less on the equity market factor SNPMRF than do sensation-avoiding hedge funds.
The loading di↵erence is -0.12 and statistically significant at the 5% level. Taken together,
these results help shed light on how sensation-seeking hedge funds can persist and raise
capital.
B. Fund Flow-Performance Relationship
Since sensation-seeking investors fuel the demand for sensation-seeking hedge funds, does
this have implications on the sensitivity of flows to past performance for sensation-seeking
hedge funds? The trading behavior results in Table VI indicate that hedge funds that are
managed by sensation seekers tend to trade stocks more often and more actively. This
is in line with sensation-seeking managers’ desire for varied and novel experiences. Based
on the same rationale, sensation-seeking hedge fund investors should turn over their hedge
fund portfolios more often and trade them more actively. A simple and common way to
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trade funds actively is to chase past fund performance. Evidence of performance chasing is
documented by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Siri and Tufano (1998) for mutual funds
and by Agarwal, Green, and Ren (2018) for hedge funds. If sensation-seeking investors are
indeed predisposed to chasing fund performance, it follows that since sensation-seeking hedge
funds tend to attract capital from sensation-seeking investors, sensation-seeking hedge funds
should attract capital that is more sensitive to past performance.
To investigate this conjecture, we estimate multivariate regressions on hedge fund annual
flow with fund performance rank based on past one-year return (RANK ) as the independent
variable of interest. We also control for the set of fund characteristics featured in equation
(1) as well as for investment style and year fixed e↵ects. The regressions are estimated
separately for sensation-seeking, -avoiding, and -neutral hedge funds. Our empirical setup
is similar to that in Siri and Tufano (1998). The results, reported in columns (1) to (3)
of Table IX, indicate that flows to sensation-seeking hedge funds are indeed more sensitive
to performance than are flows to sensation-avoiding hedge funds. A one-standard-deviation
or 0.29 increase in hedge fund one-year return percentile rank is associated with a 2.23%
increase in flow to sensation-seeking hedge funds but only a modest 0.35% increase in flow
to sensation-avoiding hedge funds. One concern is that investors may chase fund alpha as
opposed to fund return. As shown in columns (4) to (9) of Table IX, the findings remain
qualitatively unchanged when we estimate the flow regressions with fund performance rank
based on past one-year CAPM alpha (RANK CAPM ) or past one-year Fung and Hsieh
(2004) alpha (RANK FH ).
As a further robustness check, we estimate the Table IX regression with RANK on
both sensation-seeking and sensation-avoiding hedge funds, after including two additional
independent variables: SENSATION SEEKING and RANK*SENSATION SEEKING. The
indicator SENSATION SEEKING takes a value of one for sensation-seeking hedge funds and
a value of zero otherwise. The coe cient estimate on the interaction term is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that flows into sensation-seeking hedge
24
funds are more sensitive to performance. We obtain qualitatively similar results when we
replace RANK with RANK CAPM or RANK FH. These findings further support the view
that sensation seeking can shape the flow-performance relationship for hedge funds.
[Insert Tables IX and X here]
C. Alignment with Investors
The results in Section II suggest that in order to experience varied, novel, complex,
and intense sensations, sensation-seeking hedge fund managers take on nonpecuniary risks
that ultimately hurt their investors. It follows that sensation seeking should manifest as an
agency cost in fund management. If that is indeed the case, we should find weaker evidence
of sensation seeking amongst fund managers whose incentives are more aligned with those
of their investors.
One simple way to align incentives is for the manager to commit personal capital to
the fund. Therefore, to test the agency view, we split the sample into funds with personal
capital and without personal capital and rerun our baseline risk regressions. We limit the
analysis to TASS funds, as personal capital information is available only on TASS. The re-
sults reported in Panels A and B of Table X reveal sharp di↵erences in sensation seeking
activity between funds sorted on manager personal capital. For funds with personal capital,
the coe cient estimates on the pro-sensation vehicle attributes are typically negative, eco-
nomically modest, and statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 10% level. Conversely,
for funds without personal capital, the coe cient estimates on the pro-sensation attributes
are positive, economically large, and statistically significant at the 5% level.
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) show that managers who are operating closer to their
high-water marks, and hence have higher manager total deltas, outperform as their incentives
are more aligned with those of their investors. To further test the agency view, every
January 1st, we sort the sample into equal groups based on manager total delta (calculated
as in Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009)). Next, we rerun the baseline risk
25
regressions for these two groups of funds. The results reported in Panels C and D of Table
X reveal striking di↵erences in sensation-seeking activity between funds sorted on manager
total delta. For funds with low manager total deltas, the coe cient estimates on the pro-
sensation vehicle attributes are economically large and statistically significant at the 1%
level. In contrast, for funds with high manager total deltas, the coe cient estimates on the
pro-sensation vehicle attributes are economically modest and statistically indistinguishable
from zero at the 10% level. Taken together, these results suggest that in keeping with
the agency view, fund managers are less likely to indulge in sensation seeking when their
incentives are more aligned with those of their investors.
D. Investor Perceptions
To examine investor perceptions of sensation-seeking and -avoiding hedge fund managers,
we leverage on the Berk and Green (2004) model. That model contains three elements,
namely, (i) competitive provision of capital by investors to funds, (ii) di↵erential ability
to generate high returns across managers but decreasing returns to scale in deploying such
ability, and (iii) learning about managerial ability through past returns. Berk and Green
(2004) show that investments with active managers do not generate alpha because investors
competitively supply funds to managers and managers experience decreasing returns when
deploying their superior ability. Therefore, in equilibrium, capable managers manage larger
funds while less capable managers manage smaller funds. Investors are also indi↵erent be-
tween managers.
The coe cient estimates on ALPHA reported in Panel C of Table IV indicate that in the
multivariate setting, after controlling for risk and other fund characteristics such as size, fees,
and redemption terms that explain performance, sports car drivers underperform nonsports
car drivers by 24.3 basis points per month or 2.92% per year, while minivan drivers out-
perform nonminivan drivers by 26.8 basis points per month or 3.22% per year. Therefore,
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sensation-avoiding managers are indeed more capable than sensation-seeking managers.24
Consistent with the Berk and Green (2004) view that investors allocate more capital to capa-
ble managers, in Table II, we find that sport car owners manage smaller funds while minivan
drivers manage larger funds. Specifically, sports car owners manage on average US$515.24m,
which is US$303.13m less than nonsports car owners manage, while minivan drivers manage
on average US$1,945.31m, which is US$1,224.34m more than nonminivan drivers manage. In
line with the Berk and Green (2004) model, investors are on the margin indi↵erent between
funds managed by sports car and nonsports car owners since the di↵erence in raw fund alpha
in the univariate sort without controls is zero (see Table II). Therefore, investors correctly
perceive sensation-seeking managers to be less competent. However, from Table II, we see
that even though minivan drivers attract more capital, the capital di↵erential is not enough
to zero out the performance di↵erential between minivan and nonminivan drivers in the raw
alpha sort. Indeed, the results in Table II indicate that minivan drivers still outperform
nonminivan drivers by 2.40% per annum after adjusting for risk. These findings suggest
that investors do not fully appreciate the superior investment skills of sensation-avoiding
managers.
IV. Alternative Explanations and Robustness Tests
An alternative explanation for our baseline results is that the act of buying or driving
a performance car, rather than telegraphing a manager’s innate preference for sensation
seeking, actually begins to increase her tolerance for risk. To distinguish from this reverse
causality story, we estimate multivariate regressions analogous to our baseline tests on past
risk estimated over the 24-month period prior to car purchase. The coe cient estimates
reported in Panel E of Table X suggest that consistent with the view that sensation seeking
24Berk and Green’s (2004) argument relates to alpha as a measure of skill. The literature establishes that
investor-observable fund characteristics such as size, fees, and redemption terms have explanatory power for
hedge fund alpha, explanatory power that is arguably unrelated to managerial skill. Once we control for
these factors to obtain a pure measure of manager skill that is unrelated to fund characteristics, sports car
owners exhibit lower skill as measured by alpha.
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is a durable personality trait, our sensation-seeking proxies based on vehicle attributes also
explain past fund risk. Therefore, reverse causality does not drive our results.25
Barber and Odean (2001) show that female investors take on less risk than their male
counterparts (see their Table III). If males prefer sports cars while females prefer minivans,
then gender could account for our risk results. To control for gender, we include a gender
dummy in our risk regressions. We use the Genderize Python Application Programming
Interface (https://genderize.io/) to determine gender using a manager’s first name. The
estimates reported in Panel F of Table X indicate that gender does not drive our results.
It is also possible that social status or wealth drives our results. According to Pi↵ et
al. (2012), upper-class individuals, driven in part by greed, exhibit greater unethical ten-
dencies. Greed amongst high-status drivers may motivate them to take on more investment
risk. To investigate this possibility, we control for vehicle price (or MSRP) and rerun the
baseline regressions. To further control for social status, we cull data on fund manager
home prices and rerun the baseline risk regressions with home value as an additional in-
dependent variable.26 The results reported in Panels G and H of Table X indicate that
inferences remain unchanged after controlling for social status using vehicle price and home
value. Related to the wealth story is the view that nonfrugal managers take greater risk
(Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2015)). To address the frugality concern, we rerun our tests
with an alternative pro-sensation attribute, namely, horsepower per dollar, which may ap-
peal to frugal, cost-conscious sensation seekers. We find that managers who purchase higher
horsepower-per-dollar cars deliver more volatile returns and exhibit greater operational risk,
which suggests that frugality does not drive our results.
A related story is that some managers purchase expensive sports cars to mimic their more
successful peers in the industry and attract investors. This is reminiscent of the peer e↵ects
25We estimate analogous regressions on fund risk for sports car buyers with an indicator variable that takes
a value of one during the 24-month period post-purchase and a value of zero otherwise as an independent
variable. The results indicate that hedge fund managers do not increase their risk-taking after purchasing
sports cars.
26We thank Jeremy Stein for this suggestion. Home value data are obtained from the LexisNexis KnowX
platform.
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story documented by Pool, Sto↵man, and Yonker (2015) for mutual funds. The evidence
on flows in Table II however, suggests that such behavior is not rational. Performance car
owners do not attract greater flows. Indeed, owners of high horsepower and high torque cars
attract 3.00% and 1.68% less flows per annum than owners of low horsepower and torque
cars, respectively. While sports car drivers attract greater flows than do other drivers, the
di↵erence of 48 basis points per annum is economically modest and statistically insignificant
at the 10% level.
The variables SPORT and MINIVAN may proxy for marital status, which in turn may
explain risk (Love (2010) and Roussanov and Savor (2014)). To control for marital status,
we first merge our data with marriage and divorce data that are publicly available for 13
states in the U.S.27 We are able to obtain marital records for 68 out of the 273 funds that
operate in the 13 states. Using these records, we construct an indicator variable for whether
a manager is married or single. We assume that managers who operate in those states but
do not have marital records are single. The results reported in Panel I of Table X indicate
that inferences remain unchanged after controlling for marital status.
Manager biological age may also drive our results. To account for manager biological
age, we cull data on fund manager date of birth from Peoplewise (www.peoplewise.com),
which are available for about 85% of the managers in our sample.28 We then rerun the
baseline regressions for this subsample after including an additional independent variable for
manager age. The results reported in Panel J of Table X indicate that our inferences remain
unchanged with this adjustment.
Next, sample selection may cloud inferences from our results. Hedge fund managers who
choose to purchase new cars may have taken greater risks and have been more successful
27The 13 states that publicly disclose marital records are Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. See Lu, Ray,
and Teo (2016) for more information on these data.
28We find that sports car and nonsports cars owners are on average 50.06 and 50.14 years old, respectively.
Minivan and nonminivan owners are on average 49.14 and 50.19 years old, respectively. The biological age
di↵erences between sports car and nonsports car owners and between minivan and nonminivan owners are
statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 10% level.
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at parlaying risk into returns. Therefore, the probability of purchasing a new car may be
related to the propensity to take risks in the future as well. The coe cients in Tables III and
IV that supposedly explain the variation in fund risk could be contaminated by correlation
between the residuals in these cross-sectional regressions and the unobserved factors that
shape fund managers’ propensity to purchase new cars. To address these issues, we employ
the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure to correct for possible sample selection bias. To
do so, we first estimate a probit regression on the entire universe of U.S.-based hedge funds
to determine the factors underlying selection. The inverse Mills ratio is then computed from
this first stage probit and incorporated into the regression on fund risk to correct for selection
bias.
To implement the Heckman correction, a critical identifying assumption is that some
variables explain selection but not risk. If there is no such exclusion restriction, the model
is identified by only distributional assumptions about the residuals, which could lead to
problems in estimating the model parameters. The exclusion restriction that we employ is
fund flow estimated over the past 24 months. Managers of funds with higher past flows may
find it easier to purchase new cars given the resulting increase in fee revenues. At the same
time, it is unlikely that, controlling for other fund attributes such as size, past fund flows
significantly explain future fund risk. Other variables that could determine selection include
past fund return and risk. Therefore, to correct for sample selection, we first estimate a probit
regression on the probability of purchasing a new car with past fund flow, risk, returns, and
the other control variables used in the equation (1) regressions as independent variables.
None of the coe cient estimates on past risk and performance in the selection equations
is statistically significant at conventional levels. In line with our intuition, the coe cient
estimates on fund flow in the selection equations are positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level. In the Heckman model, the coe cient estimate on the inverse Mills ratio takes
the sign of the correlation between the residuals in the regression that explain selection and
hedge fund risk. In all of the risk regressions, the coe cients on the inverse Mills ratio are
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negative, albeit statistically indistinguishable from zero. The sign suggests that, contrary to
the sample selection story, managers who purchase new cars subsequently take on less risk.
The estimates from the second stage regressions reported in Panel K of Table X indicate
that our findings are robust to sample selection.
A related endogeneity story is that, conditional on purchasing a new car, managers
who purchase sports cars may have taken greater risks and have been more successful at
parlaying risk into returns. To investigate this story, we estimate a probit regression on the
probability of a sports car purchase with past two-year fund flow, risk, returns, as well as the
other control variables used in the equation (1) regressions as independent variables. We find
that none of the coe cient estimates on past risk and performance is statistically significant
at conventional levels. Only the estimate on past fund flow is statistically distinguishable
from zero at the 5% level. Inferences do not change when we estimate the probit with fund
idiosyncratic risk and alpha in place of fund risk and return. These findings cast doubt on
the endogeneity view.
Another concern is that performance car purchases may be driven by risk-seeking motives
that are unrelated to sensation seeking. Our trading behavior results cast doubt on this view
by showing that hedge fund managers who purchase performance cars trade more often, more
actively, and more unconventionally, and prefer lottery-like stocks – behavior that is strongly
consistent with sensation seeking.29 Nonetheless, to address such concerns, we control for
past fund risk or idiosyncratic risk estimated over the last 24 months and reestimate our
baseline regressions. The coe cient estimates on past risk in these regressions capture the
association between future risk and past risk seeking that is unrelated to sensation seeking.
The results reported in Panel L of Table X suggest that the pro- and anti-sensation variables
still explain future fund risk even after controlling for past risk-seeking motives that are
unrelated to sensation seeking.30
29For example, Grinblatt and Keloharu (2009) argue that trading is more in keeping with sensation seeking
than with risk seeking. According to them, “participation in the stock market is perceived to be financially
risky, but in the absence of trading, lacks novelty and variety.”
30Past risk can also capture risk-seeking motives that are related to sensation seeking, for example, for
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Yet another concern is that performance vehicle purchases could proxy for either skewness
preference or a propensity to trade excessively. The latter has been linked to overconfidence
by Barber and Odean (2001). To address this concern, we control for past fund return
skewness estimated over the last 24 months as well as EXCESSIVETRADING estimated over
the last eight quarters and reestimate our baseline risk regressions. The results reported in
Panel M of Table X suggest that neither past skewness preference nor past excessive trading
drives our findings.31
V. Conclusion
Using a novel data set of automobile purchases by hedge fund managers, in this paper,
we exploit cross-sectional variation in vehicle attributes to investigate the e↵ects of sensation
seeking on investment behavior. We argue that the purchase of a powerful sports car signals
the intent to drive in a spirited fashion and therefore conveys a propensity for sensation
seeking.
Our results empirically validate the advice given by some hedge fund allocators to avoid
managers who drive fancy sports cars. We find that managers who own performance cars take
on more investment risk than do other managers, without being compensated with higher
returns. Therefore, performance car owners deliver lower Sharpe and information ratios
than do nonperformance car owners. The incremental risk-taking by sports car enthusiasts
extends beyond financial markets to the fund operations arena. Sensation seekers are more
likely to terminate their funds, disclose violations on their Form ADVs, and exhibit greater
operational risk. Sensation seeking also shapes trading behavior. Managers who embrace
powerful sports cars trade more frequently, actively, and unconventionally than do managers
who eschew such cars. They also gravitate toward lottery-like stocks. Trading hurts the
performance car owners. See the results reported in Panel E of Table X. The resultant collinearity reduces
the power of our tests and makes it harder for us to obtain statistically significant coe cient estimates.
31We also estimate multivariate regressions on fund skewness post-vehicle purchase. The findings reported
in Panel B of Table IAI in the Internet Appendix confirm that the pro- and anti-sensation variables are also
largely unrelated to future skewness.
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performance of sensation seekers more than it hurts the performance of sensation avoiders.
An advantage of investigating sensation seeking amongst professional fund managers,
as opposed to retail investors, is that we can explore the interaction of investors and fund
managers in the context of sensation seeking. We find that some investors are themselves sus-
ceptible to sensation seeking. FoF managers who own performance cars take more risk than
do FoF managers who own practical but unexciting cars. Sensation-seeking investors in turn
fuel the demand for sensation-seeking hedge fund managers. Sensation-seeking FoFs load
more on sensation-seeking hedge funds than do sensation-avoiding FoFs. Consistent with
sensation-seeking investors’ propensity to trade actively by chasing fund performance, the
flows of sensation-seeking hedge funds are more sensitive to past fund performance than are
the flows of sensation-avoiding hedge funds. Moreover, in line with the view that sensation
seeking manifests as an agency cost in investment management, managers whose incentives
are aligned with those of their investors are less likely to partake in sensation seeking. Fi-
nally, while investors understand that sensation-seeking managers are less competent, they
do not fully appreciate the superior investment skills of sensation-avoiding managers.
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Vehicle attribute Number of observations Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sports car (indicator variable) 1,774 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00
Maximum horsepower (bhp) 1,759 266.21 264.50 82.27 70.00 620.00
Maximum torque (pound-feet) 1,756 267.32 254.00 85.68 68.00 663.00
Minivan (indicator variable) 1,774 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
Passenger volume (cubic feet) 1,386 113.36 102.00 28.08 45.00 211.00
IIHS average safety rating 1,171 3.44 3.50 0.58 1.50 4.00
Price (US$) 1,761 39,621.47 33,300.00 25,650.53 9,990.00 386,500.00
Table I
This table reports summary statistics on the vehicles that have been matched to the hedge fund managers in our sample. Vehicle purchase records
are obtained from VIN Place (vin.place), which culls data from dealerships and auto insurance companies and captures the vast majority of new
vehicle purchases in the U.S. VIN Place supplies vehicle make, model, year, and vehicle identification number (VIN). Additional information on
car details such as body trim and style come from Autocheck (www.autocheck.com). Other vehicle attribute data are obtained from
www.cars.com, www.cars-data.com, and the IIHS (www.iihs.org). Sports cars are vehicles with any of the following body styles: two-door
coupe, two-door convertible, and two-door hatchback. Minivans are vehicles with any of the following body styles: sports van, passenger van,
and extended passenger van. IIHS average safety rating is the safety rating for the vehicle from the IIHS, reported on a five-point scale and
averaged across five different dimensions, namely, (i) small front overlap, (ii) moderate front overlap, (iii) side, (iv) roof strength, and (v) head
restraints and seats. Price is Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price or MSRP for the vehicle during year of sale. The sample period is from January
2004 to December 2015.
Summary Statistics
Sports car Non-sports car Spread High horsepower Low horsepower Spread High torque Low torque Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of funds 163 1,611 981 793 901 873
Return (%) 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.51 -0.01 0.51 0.49 0.02
Alpha (%) 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.19 0.20 -0.01 0.20 0.19 0.01
Flow (%) 0.54 0.50 0.04 0.39 0.64 -0.25 0.43 0.57 -0.14
Total risk (%) 3.65 3.13 0.52** 3.32 2.99 0.33** 3.35 2.99 0.36**
Idiosyncratic risk (%) 2.39 2.04 0.35** 2.16 1.99 0.17** 2.19 1.96 0.23**
Management fee (%) 1.38 1.42 -0.04 1.41 1.43 -0.02 1.40 1.43 -0.03
Performance fee (%) 16.64 17.08 -0.44 17.10 16.97 0.13 17.11 16.98 0.13
High-water mark (dummy) 0.79 0.84 -0.05 0.84 0.84 0.00 0.84 0.84 0.00
Fraction of funds with lock-ups 0.44 0.51 -0.06 0.49 0.52 -0.03 0.49 0.51 -0.02
Lock-up period (days) 275.03 244.85 30.18 244.13 250.95 -6.82 247.21 247.38 -0.17
Redemption period (days) 88.22 84.25 3.97 86.61 82.15 4.46 86.50 82.67 3.83
Leveraged (dummy) 0.68 0.64 0.04 0.63 0.67 -0.04* 0.63 0.67 -0.04
Fund age (years) 7.91 8.02 -0.11 7.89 7.88 0.01 7.94 7.89 0.05
Assets under management (US$m) 515.24 818.37 -303.13 388.15 1,289.13 -900.98** 360.48 1,235.01 -874.53*
Minivan Non-minivan Spread High passenger volume
Low passenger 
volume Spread High safety rating Low safety rating Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of funds 101 1673 1,105 669 676 495
Return (%) 0.56 0.50 0.06 0.51 0.48 0.03 0.46 0.51 -0.05
Alpha (%) 0.37 0.17 0.20** 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.24 -0.08
Flow (%) 0.98 0.47 0.51 0.41 0.65 -0.24 0.45 0.75 -0.30
Total risk (%) 2.78 3.15 -0.37 2.87 3.33 -0.46** 2.81 3.09 -0.28**
Idiosyncratic risk (%) 1.8 2.07 -0.27 1.88 2.20 -0.32** 1.88 2.09 -0.21**
Management fee (%) 1.55 1.41 0.14* 1.44 1.38 0.06 1.42 1.42 0.00
Performance fee (%) 17.2 17.03 0.17 17.11 16.93 0.18 17.02 17.70 -0.68
High-water mark (dummy) 0.86 0.84 0.02 0.85 0.82 0.03 0.85 0.84 0.01
Fraction of funds with lock-ups 0.42 0.51 -0.09 0.48 0.53 -0.05 0.49 0.52 -0.02
Lock-up period (days) 232.02 248.05 -16.03 248.15 246.01 2.14 229.10 256.31 -27.21
Redemption period (days) 61.29 86.03 -24.74** 84.90 84.16 0.74 83.26 81.97 1.29
Leveraged (dummy) 0.67 0.65 0.02 0.65 0.64 0.01 0.64 0.66 -0.02
Fund age (years) 6.95 8.11 -1.16** 8.14 7.60 0.54 8.13 7.91 0.22
Assets under management (US$m) 1,945.31 720.97 1,224.34 643.44 1,029.58 -386.14 502.82 1,564.75 -1,061.93
Panel B: Anti-sensation vehicle attribute
Table II
Sorts on Hedge Fund Manager Automobile Attributes
This table reports performance, flows, risk, and characteristics for funds sorted on pro-sensation and anti-sensation vehicle attributes. The pro-sensation attributes are sports car, maximum horsepower, and
maximum torque, while the anti-sensation attributes are minivan, passenger volume, and safety rating. Sports cars are vehicles with any of the following body styles: two-door coupe, two-door convertible, and two-
door hatchback. Minivans are vehicles with any of the following body styles: sports van, passenger van, and extended passenger van. Safety rating is the average IIHS safety rating for the vehicle. There are 1,774
cars with matches to the hedge fund managers in our sample. For each of the vehicle attributes maximum horsepower, maximum torque, passenger volume, and IIHS average safety rating, we sort the vehicles into
two groups based on the median value of that attribute in our sample. For example, high horsepower vehicles are vehicles whose maximum horsepower equals or exceeds the median horsepower of the cars in our
sample. The other cars are classified as low horsepower cars. To minimize look ahead bias, all hedge fund performance, flow, risk, and characteristics are computed after the purchase date of the vehicle. Return is
the monthly fund return. Alpha is the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. Flow is the monthly fund flow. Total risk is the standard
deviation of monthly returns, while idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the monthly residuals from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. Statistical inferences are derived from White (1980)
standard errors. The sample period is January 2004 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
Panel A: Pro-sensation vehicle attribute
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPORT 0.663** 0.348*
(2.81) (2.38)
POWER 0.450** 0.269**
(5.66) (4.88)
TORQUE 0.382** 0.233**
(4.77) (4.16)
MINIVAN -0.551** -0.490**
(-2.75) (-3.19)
SPACE -1.067** -0.696**
(-4.75) (-4.42)
SAFETY -0.394** -0.230*
(-2.73) (-2.47)
RETURNm-1,m-24 0.071 0.077 0.076 0.070 0.076 0.077
(1.04) (1.14) (1.15) (0.95) (0.97) (0.88)
ALPHAm-1,m-24 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 -0.011 0.005
(-0.22) (-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.09) (-0.18) (0.08)
MGTFEE 0.328 0.332 0.315 0.330 0.341 0.332 0.338* 0.340* 0.330* 0.355* 0.360* 0.391*
(1.76) (1.77) (1.72) (1.49) (1.43) (1.55) (2.56) (2.55) (2.52) (2.25) (2.15) (2.54)
PERFFEE -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.000 -0.000 0.011 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.010
(-0.17) (-0.47) (-0.36) (-0.50) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.78) (0.54) (0.62) (0.46) (0.70) (0.54)
LOCKUP 0.222 0.271 0.247 0.327 0.369 0.371 0.173 0.201 0.189 0.250* 0.291* 0.306*
(1.24) (1.53) (1.40) (1.74) (1.86) (1.74) (1.49) (1.73) (1.63) (2.00) (2.17) (2.11)
LEVERAGE 0.215 0.269 0.227 0.350 0.306 0.391 0.333** 0.365** 0.341** 0.440** 0.427** 0.509**
(1.10) (1.42) (1.20) (1.68) (1.40) (1.66) (2.62) (2.95) (2.75) (3.22) (2.96) (3.23)
AGE 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.025 0.039 0.028 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.021 0.011
(0.85) (0.99) (1.01) (1.18) (1.72) (1.25) (0.09) (0.21) (0.22) (0.55) (1.28) (0.75)
REDEMPTION 0.015 0.009 0.006 -0.006 -0.017 0.027 -0.014 -0.018 -0.020 -0.029 -0.031 -0.005
(0.37) (0.22) (0.14) (-0.13) (-0.35) (0.55) (-0.73) (-0.92) (-1.00) (-1.25) (-1.16) (-0.17)
log(FUNDSIZE) -0.108 -0.130* -0.131* -0.165** -0.145* -0.155* -0.113** -0.126** -0.128** -0.155** -0.159** -0.158**
(-1.96) (-2.34) (-2.40) (-2.72) (-2.33) (-2.35) (-2.77) (-3.05) (-3.10) (-3.41) (-3.36) (-3.27)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.213 0.230 0.227 0.238 0.261 0.244 0.214 0.228 0.226 0.242 0.261 0.252
N 2,457 2,437 2,428 2,457 1,955 1,627 2,457 2,437 2,428 2,457 1,955 1,627
Dependent variable
Multivariate Regressions on Hedge Fund Risk with Pro-Sensation and Anti-Sensation Variables
Table III
This table reports coefficient estimates from multivariate regressions on hedge fund risk. The dependent variables are RISK and IDIORISK. RISK is the standard deviation of monthly hedge fund returns.
IDIORISK is the standard deviation of monthly hedge fund residuals from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. RISK and IDIORISK are estimated over each nonoverlapping 24-month period
after the vehicle purchase month. The independent variables include the pro-sensation vehicle attributes SPORT, POWER, and TORQUE as well as the anti-sensation vehicle attributes MINIVAN, SPACE,
and SAFETY. SPORT is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for sports cars, where sports cars are vehicles with any of the following body styles: two-door coupe, two-door convertible, and two-
door hatchback. POWER is maximum horsepower in units of 100 bhp. TORQUE is maximum torque in units of 100 pound-feet. MINIVAN is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for minivans, 
where minivans are vehicles with any of the following body styles: sports van, passenger van, and extended passenger van. SPACE is passenger volume in units of 100 cubic feet. SAFETY is the IIHS
average safety rating. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE), performance fee (PERFFEE), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP), leverage
indicator (LEVERAGE), fund age in years (AGE), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION), and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE)). Controls also include past RETURN or ALPHA estimated over
the prior 24-month period, as well as strategy and year fixed effects. RETURN and ALPHA are the monthly fund return and alpha, respectively. The t -statistics derived from robust standard errors
clustered by fund are in parentheses. The sample period is January 2004 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
RISK IDIORISK
SPORT POWER TORQUE MINIVAN SPACE SAFETY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.110** -0.047** -0.045** 0.156** 0.187** 0.070**
(-3.72) (-2.69) (-2.84) (3.29) (5.63) (4.90)
-0.096** -0.063** -0.056** 0.115 0.155** 0.041*
(-2.69) (-2.76) (-2.71) (1.47) (3.38) (2.09)
-0.243** -0.093** -0.078** 0.268** 0.192** -0.017
(-3.15) (-3.82) (-3.57) (3.19) (2.72) (-0.47)
Panel A: Multivariate OLS regressions on SHARPE
Panel B: Multivariate OLS regressions on INFORMATION
Panel C: Multivariate OLS regressions on ALPHA
Table IV
Multivariate Regressions on Hedge Fund Performance Metrics
This table reports coefficient estimates from multivariate regression analysis of hedge fund Sharpe ratio, information ratio, and
monthly alpha. The dependent variable is SHARPE, INFORMATION, or ALPHA. SHARPE is the fund Sharpe ratio, that is, the
average monthly fund excess return divided by the standard deviation of monthly fund returns, estimated over each non-
overlapping 24-month period after the vehicle purchase month. INFORMATION is the fund information ratio, that is, the average
monthly fund alpha divided by the standard deviation of monthly fund residuals, estimated over each nonoverlapping 24-month
period after the vehicle purchase month. ALPHA is the monthly hedge fund alpha relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-
factor model, where the factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. The independent variables include the pro-sensation
vehicle attributes SPORT, POWER, and TORQUE as well as the anti-sensation vehicle attributes MINIVAN, SPACE, and SAFETY.
SPORT is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for sports cars, where sports cars are vehicles with any of the following
body styles: two-door coupe, two-door convertible, and two-door hatchback. POWER is maximum horsepower in units of 100
bhp. TORQUE is maximum torque in units of 100 pound-feet. MINIVAN is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for
minivans, where minivans are vehicles with any of the following body styles: sports van, passenger van, and extended passenger
van. SPACE is passenger volume in units of 100 cubic feet. SAFETY is the IIHS average safety rating. The other independent
variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE), performance fee (PERFFEE), lock-up period in years
(LOCKUP), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE), fund age in years (AGE), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION), and log
of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE)). The controls also include strategy and year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates on the
independent variables that are not based on vehicle attributes are omitted for brevity. In Panels A and B, t -statistics derived from
robust standard errors clustered by fund are in parentheses. In Panel C, t -statistics derived from robust standard errors clustered by
fund and month are in parentheses. The sample period is January 2004 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; **
significant at the 1% level. 
Independent variable
SPORT POWER TORQUE MINIVAN SPACE SAFETY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.789** 0.398** 0.335** -1.641** -0.733** -0.694**
(3.16) (5.19) (4.81) (-3.10) (-3.73) (-4.61)
[0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [-0.004] [-0.003] [-0.013]
3.349** 1.723** 1.452** 0.165 0.530* 0.391**
(4.10) (4.51) (4.47) (-1.69) (-2.52) (-4.31)
0.831** 0.651** 0.497** -1.459** -0.325 0.051
(2.97) (5.01) (4.19) (-2.91) (-0.77) (0.25)
[0.184] [0.127] [0.098] [-0.186] [-0.056] [0.009]
0.083* 0.058** 0.042** -0.253** -0.172** -0.075*
(2.06) (5.22) (4.14) (-2.97) (-2.83) (-2.05)
Panel C: Multivariate logit regressions on VIOLATION
Panel D: Multivariate OLS regressions on OMEGA
Table V
Multivariate Regressions on Hedge Fund Operational Risk Metrics
This table reports coefficient estimates from multivariate logit and Cox regressions on hedge fund termination, multivariate logit
regressions on an indicator variable for hedge fund Form ADV violations, and multivariate OLS regressions on hedge fund ω-Scores.
The dependent variable TERMINATION takes a value of one after a hedge fund stops reporting and states that it has liquidated, and
zero otherwise. The dependent variable VIOLATION takes a value of one when the hedge fund manager reports on her Form ADV
that she has been associated with a regulatory, civil, or criminal violation, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable OMEGA or
fund ω-Score is an operational risk instrument derived from fund performance, volatility, age, size, fee structure, and other fund
characteristics as per Brown et al. (2009). OMEGA is estimated over each nonoverlapping 24-month period after the vehicle purchase
month. The independent variables include the pro-sensation vehicle attributes SPORT, POWER, and TORQUE as well as the anti-
sensation vehicle attributes MINIVAN, SPACE, and SAFETY. SPORT is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for sports cars,
where sports cars are vehicles with any of the following body styles: two-door coupe, two-door convertible, and two-door hatchback.
POWER is maximum horsepower in units of 100 bhp. TORQUE is maximum torque in units of 100 pound-feet. MINIVAN is an
indicator variable that takes a value of one for minivans, where minivans are vehicles with any of the following body styles: sports
van, passenger van, and extended passenger van. SPACE is passenger volume in units of 100 cubic feet. SAFETY is the IIHS average
safety rating. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE), performance fee
(PERFFEE), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE), fund age in years (AGE), redemption period in
months (REDEMPTION), and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE)). The controls also include strategy and year fixed effects. The
regressions on fund termination include additional controls for past RISK, RETURN, and FLOW estimated over the prior 24-month
period. RISK is the standard deviation of monthly hedge fund returns, RETURN is the monthly fund return, and FLOW is the monthly 
fund flow. The coefficient estimates on the independent variables that are not based on vehicle attributes are omitted for brevity. The t -
statistics derived from robust standard errors clustered by fund are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets. The sample period
is January 2004 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
Independent variable
Panel A: Multivariate logit regressions on TERMINATION
Panel B: Multivariate Cox regressions on TERMINATION
Sport Non-sport Spread High horsepower Low horsepower Spread High torque Low torque Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
TURNOVER 0.232 0.171 0.061* 0.242 0.173 0.069* 0.233 0.180 0.053
NONSPRATIO 0.716 0.672 0.044* 0.741 0.662 0.079** 0.724 0.678 0.046**
ACTIVESHARE 0.588 0.538 0.050** 0.596 0.540 0.056** 0.589 0.545 0.044**
NRSQUARED 0.682 0.617 0.065** 0.650 0.597 0.053** 0.637 0.607 0.030**
DISTINCTIVENESS 0.715 0.703 0.012 0.726 0.683 0.043** 0.716 0.692 0.024*
EXCESSIVETRADING 0.069 0.044 0.025* 0.059 0.035 0.024** 0.048 0.046 0.002
LOTTERY 0.073 0.049 0.024** 0.082 0.052 0.030** 0.078 0.055 0.023**
Minivan Non-minivan Spread High passenger volume Low passenger volume Spread High safety rating Low safety rating Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
TURNOVER 0.085 0.212 -0.127** 0.151 0.191 -0.040* 0.177 0.175 0.002
NONSPRATIO 0.612 0.705 -0.093** 0.643 0.705 -0.062** 0.679 0.682 -0.003
ACTIVESHARE 0.421 0.551 -0.130** 0.460 0.568 -0.108** 0.506 0.537 -0.031**
NRSQUARED 0.586 0.653 -0.067** 0.625 0.676 -0.051* 0.649 0.659 -0.010
DISTINCTIVENESS 0.685 0.723 -0.038* 0.722 0.727 -0.005 0.715 0.735 -0.020*
EXCESSIVETRADING 0.045 0.066 -0.022 0.053 0.077 -0.024** 0.061 0.072 -0.011
LOTTERY 0.036 0.068 -0.032** 0.045 0.068 -0.023** 0.052 0.062 -0.010**
This table reports trading behavior measures for funds sorted on pro-sensation and anti-sensation vehicle attributes. The pro-sensation attributes are sports car, maximum horsepower, and maximum
torque, while the anti-sensation attributes are minivan, passenger volume, and safety rating. Sports cars are vehicles with any of the following body styles: two-door coupe, two-door convertible, and two-
door hatchback. Minivans are vehicles with any of the following body styles: sports van, passenger van, and extended passenger van. Safety rating is the average IIHS safety rating for the vehicle. There
are 1,774 cars with matches to the hedge fund managers in our sample. For each of the vehicle attributes maximum horsepower, maximum torque, passenger volume, and IIHS average safety rating, we
sort the vehicles into two groups based on the median value of that attribute in our sample. For example, high horsepower vehicles are vehicles with maximum horsepower that equals or exceeds the
median horsepower of the cars in our sample. The other cars are classified as low horsepower cars. The trading behavior measures include TURNOVER, NONSPRATIO, ACTIVESHARE, NRSQUARED,
DISTINCTIVENESS, EXCESSIVETRADING, and LOTTERY. TURNOVER is the annualized turnover of a hedge fund manager's long-only stock portfolio. NONSPRATIO is the ratio of the number of
non-S&P 500 index stocks bought in a quarter to the total number of new positions in the quarter. ACTIVESHARE is the Active Share relative to the S&P 500 (Cremers and Petajisto (2009)).
NRSQUARED is one minus the R2 from the regression of fund excess returns against the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. DISTINCTIVENESS is the Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012) strategy
distinctiveness index measure. EXCESSIVETRADING, computed from fund long-only quarterly stock holdings, is the return that quarter of the fund had it not traded since the start of the year in excess
of its actual return that same quarter (Barber and Odean (2000, 2001)). LOTTERY is the maximum daily stock return over the past one month averaged across stocks held by the fund. The trading
behavior measures NONSPRATIO, ACTIVESHARE, NRSQUARED, and DISTINCTIVENESS are defined such that an increase in any one of them represents a more active or unconventional portfolio.
To minimize look-ahead bias, all trading behavior measures are computed after the purchase date of the vehicle. Statistical inferences are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is
January 2004 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
Trading Behavior Analysis
Table VI
Panel A: Pro-sensation car attributes
Panel B: Anti-sensation car attributes
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPORT 1.937* 1.162
(2.22) (1.95)
POWER 0.761** 0.440**
(4.31) (3.55)
TORQUE 0.648** 0.359*
(3.23) (2.53)
MINIVAN -1.380** -0.815*
(-2.87) (-2.14)
SPACE -1.637* -1.261*
(-2.23) (-2.14)
SAFETY -1.075** -0.774*
(-2.84) (-2.05)
RETURNm-1,m-24 0.049 0.084 0.099 0.162 0.364** 0.470**
(0.28) (0.57) (0.68) (0.83) (3.35) (4.14)
ALPHAm-1,m-24 -0.010 -0.006 0.017 0.044 0.345* 0.249
(-0.04) (-0.03) (0.08) (0.16) (2.26) (1.62)
MGTFEE 0.267 0.116 0.022 0.170 0.408 0.299 0.225 0.138 0.097 0.166 0.380 0.355
(0.84) (0.40) (0.07) (0.33) (0.72) (0.52) (0.85) (0.55) (0.36) (0.37) (0.93) (0.67)
PERFFEE -0.045 -0.061 -0.054 -0.090* -0.030 -0.058 -0.028 -0.037 -0.033 -0.058 -0.002 -0.028
(-1.32) (-1.92) (-1.50) (-2.04) (-0.73) (-1.63) (-1.26) (-1.72) (-1.35) (-1.73) (-0.07) (-0.90)
LOCKUP -0.921* -0.330 -0.517 -0.793 -0.785 -0.684 -0.664** -0.315 -0.433* -0.655 -0.821 -0.774
(-2.55) (-1.19) (-1.88) (-1.71) (-1.47) (-1.20) (-2.75) (-1.53) (-2.18) (-1.63) (-1.70) (-1.46)
LEVERAGE 0.018 0.165 0.141 0.311 0.297 0.461 0.204 0.284 0.264 0.556 0.584 0.678
(0.05) (0.57) (0.45) (0.63) (0.50) (0.78) (0.87) (1.30) (1.13) (1.31) (1.25) (1.32)
AGE -0.020 -0.037 -0.040 -0.015 0.041 0.040 -0.005 -0.014 -0.016 0.006 0.046 0.043
(-0.66) (-1.43) (-1.45) (-0.38) (0.94) (1.04) (-0.25) (-0.77) (-0.79) (0.20) (1.35) (1.19)
REDEMPTION -0.058 -0.064 -0.058 -0.101 -0.066 -0.050 -0.044 -0.049* -0.046 -0.077 -0.059 -0.065
(-1.47) (-1.83) (-1.43) (-1.71) (-1.16) (-0.98) (-1.82) (-2.19) (-1.78) (-2.01) (-1.79) (-1.55)
log(FUNDSIZE) -0.115 -0.117* -0.127* -0.218* -0.121 -0.247* -0.090* -0.090* -0.096* -0.160* -0.089 -0.164
(-1.99) (-2.17) (-2.29) (-2.65) (-1.08) (-2.44) (-2.49) (-2.44) (-2.44) (-2.60) (-1.41) (-2.01)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.335 0.385 0.349 0.323 0.373 0.470 0.280 0.306 0.275 0.259 0.320 0.367
N 198 192 192 198 192 192 198 192 192 198 192 192
Table VII
Multivariate Regressions on Fund of Hedge Funds (FoF) Risk with Pro- and Anti-Sensation Variables
This table reports coefficient estimates from multivariate regressions on fund of hedge funds (FoF) risk. The dependent variables are RISK and IDIORISK. RISK is the standard
deviation of monthly FoF returns. IDIORISK is the standard deviation of monthly FoF residuals from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. RISK and IDIORISK are
estimated over each nonoverlapping 24-month period after the vehicle purchase month. The independent variables include the pro-sensation vehicle attributes SPORT, POWER,
and TORQUE as well as the anti-sensation vehicle attributes MINIVAN, SPACE, and SAFETY. SPORT is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for sports cars, where
sports cars are vehicles with any of the following body styles: two-door coupe, two-door convertible, and two-door hatchback. POWER is maximum horsepower in units of 100
bhp. TORQUE is maximum torque in units of 100 pound-feet. MINIVAN is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for minivans, where minivans are vehicles with any of
the following body styles: sports van, passenger van, and extended passenger van. SPACE is passenger volume in units of 100 cubic feet. SAFETY is the IIHS average safety
rating. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE), performance fee (PERFFEE), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP),
leverage indicator (LEVERAGE), fund age in years (AGE), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION), and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE)). The controls also include
for past RETURN or ALPHA estimated over the prior 24-month period, as well as year fixed effects. RETURN and ALPHA are the monthly FoF return and alpha, respectively.
The t -statistics derived from robust standard errors clustered by fund are in parentheses. The sample period is January 2004 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; **
significant at the 1% level. 
Dependent variable
RISK IDIORISK
Sensation-seeking portfolio (SS) Sensation-neutral portfolio (SN) Sensation-avoiding portfolio (SA) Spread 1 (SS-SA) Spread 2 (SS-SN) Spread 3 (SA-SN)
Hedge fund portfolio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sensation-seeking portfolio (SS) 0.412** 0.014 -0.270* 0.681** 0.397** -0.284**
(2.64) (0.19) (-2.54) (5.47) (3.30) (-2.92)
Sensation-neutral portfolio (SN) 0.476* 0.806** 0.781** -0.305 -0.330 -0.025
(2.16) (6.50) (4.30) (-1.52) (-1.57) (-0.16)
Sensation-avoiding portfolio (SA) -0.334 -0.146 0.010 -0.344 -0.188 0.156
(-1.36) (-1.33) (0.07) (-1.65) (-0.91) (1.07)
R2 0.434 0.774 0.455 0.267 0.143 0.209
N 105 105 105 105 105 105
Sensation-seeking portfolio (SS) 0.502** 0.066 -0.140 0.642** 0.435** -0.207*
(3.74) (0.98) (-1.39) (5.43) (3.60) (-1.98)
Sensation-neutral portfolio (SN) 1.145** 0.979** 1.002** 0.143 0.166 0.023
(4.43) (7.42) (5.70) (0.59) (0.74) (0.16)
Sensation-avoiding portfolio (SA) -0.390 -0.162 -0.108 -0.282 -0.227 0.054
(-1.80) (-1.51) (-0.67) (-1.40) (-1.19) (0.37)
R2 0.621 0.812 0.585 0.432 0.379 0.307
N 105 105 105 105 105 105
Panel B: Controlling for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors
Table VIII
Time-Series Regressions on Fund of Hedge Funds (FoF) Portfolio Excess Returns
This table reports time-series regressions on fund of hedge funds (FoF) portfolio excess returns with hedge fund portfolio excess returns as independent variables. The sensation-seeking FoF portfolio is
the average excess return of all FoF managers that previously bought a sports car. The sensation-avoiding FoF portfolio is the average excess return of all FoF managers that previously bought a
minivan. The sensation-neutral FoF portfolio is the average excess return of all FoF managers that previously purchased vehicles that were neither sports cars nor minivans. Excess return is the fund
return in excess of the risk-free rate. The sensation-seeking, -avoiding, and -neutral hedge fund portfolios are defined analogously. Time-series regressions are estimated on the three FoF portfolios with 
the three hedge fund portfolios as independent variables. Time-series regressions are also estimated on the spreads between pairs of FoF portfolios with the same set of regressors. Spread 1 is the
difference between the sensation-seeking and sensation-avoiding FoF portfolios. Spread 2 is the difference between the sensation-seeking and sensation-neutral FoF portfolios. Spread 3 is the difference
between the sensation-avoiding and sensation-neutral FoF portfolios. In Panel A, we do not control for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. In Panel B, we control for co-variation with
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The factor loadings for the FoF portfolios are omitted for brevity. The t -statistics derived from White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period is
January 2004 to December 2015. However, the effective period for the analysis only starts in April 2007 (and ends in December 2015) as there are no minivan purchases by FoF managers in the early
part of the sample period. * Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
Fund of hedge funds (FoF) portfolio
Panel A: Without controlling for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors
Sensation-seeking HFs Sensation-avoiding HFs Sensation-neutral HFs Sensation-seeking HFs Sensation-avoiding HFs Sensation-neutral HFs Sensation-seeking HFs Sensation-avoiding HFs Sensation-neutral HFs
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
RANK 7.703** 1.214 3.423**
(3.81) (0.57) (6.41)
RANK_CAPM 3.733* -0.343 0.761*
(2.54) (-0.24) (2.02)
RANK_FH 3.724* -0.897 1.691**
(2.59) (-0.69) (3.39)
RISK 14.305 -8.505 -8.712 18.936 -21.215 0.464 20.703 -19.503 0.808
(1.08) (-0.30) (-1.28) (0.89) (-0.59) (0.06) (1.05) (-0.57) (0.12)
MGTFEE 0.170 1.134 -0.271* -0.512 0.349 -0.247 -0.283 0.375 -0.198
(0.22) (1.19) (-2.36) (-0.42) (0.32) (-1.28) (-0.24) (0.35) (-1.06)
PERFFEE -0.079 -0.131 -0.026 -0.146 -0.076 -0.038 -0.117 -0.069 -0.057*
(-1.56) (-1.02) (-1.17) (-1.92) (-0.55) (-1.69) (-1.76) (-0.51) (-2.42)
LOCKUP 0.409 0.278 0.320 0.282 0.006 0.302 0.252 -0.015 0.325
(0.82) (0.64) (1.70) (0.46) (0.01) (1.41) (0.42) (-0.03) (1.50)
LEVERAGE 0.220 0.631 -0.135 0.060 1.603 -0.174 0.097 1.569 -0.217
(0.34) (0.60) (-0.73) (0.07) (1.61) (-0.85) (0.12) (1.61) (-1.10)
AGE -0.169** -0.057 -0.095** -0.152* -0.027 -0.082** -0.151* -0.034 -0.093**
(-3.15) (-0.69) (-5.61) (-2.32) (-0.33) (-4.05) (-2.32) (-0.41) (-4.86)
REDEMPTION -0.102 -0.115 0.011 -0.339 0.048 0.053 -0.209 0.057 0.054
(-0.46) (-0.26) (0.26) (-1.29) (0.11) (1.21) (-0.91) (0.14) (1.24)
log(FUNDSIZE) -0.108 -0.987** -0.319** 0.286 -0.874** -0.181** 0.367 -0.870** -0.240**
(-0.36) (-3.21) (-4.66) (0.90) (-2.93) (-2.68) (1.16) (-2.93) (-3.35)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.271 0.371 0.130 0.164 0.275 0.067 0.156 0.278 0.091
N 199 110 1753 199 110 1753 199 110 1753
Table IX
Multivariate Regressions on Hedge Fund Flow
This table reports coefficient estimates from OLS multivariate regressions on hedge fund flow. The dependent variable is FLOW or annual hedge fund flow in percentage. The independent variables of interest are RANK, RANK_CAPM, and
RANK_FH. RANK is the fund's fractional rank, which captures its percentile performance and is based on its past one-year return, relative to other funds in the same group in the same period and ranges from zero to one, as in Siri and Tufano
(1998). RANK_CAPM is the fund's fractional rank based on its past one-year CAPM alpha. RANK_FH is the fund's fractional rank based on its past one-year Fung and Hsieh (2004) alpha. One-year CAPM alpha is the monthly fund abnormal
return relative to the CAPM averaged over the last year, where the betas are estimated over the last 24 months. The one-year Fung and Hsieh (2004) alpha is computed analogously. The other independent variables include fund characteristics
such as the standard deviation of fund returns estimated over the prior 24-month period (RISK), management fee (MGTFEE), performance fee (PERFFEE), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE), fund age in
years (AGE), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION), and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE)). The controls also include strategy and year fixed effects. The regressions are estimated separately for three groups of hedge fund
managers. The sensation-seeking group comprises managers that previously bought a sports car. The sensation-avoiding group comprises managers that previously bought a minivan. The sensation-neutral group comprises managers that
previously purchased vehicles that were neither sports cars nor minivans. The t -statistics derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund are in parentheses. The sample period is January 2004 to December 2015. * Significant at
the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
Dependent variable = FLOW
SPORT POWER TORQUE MINIVAN SPACE SAFETY SPORT POWER TORQUE MINIVAN SPACE SAFETY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1.492* 0.453* 0.436* -0.796 -1.240** -0.601* 0.846* 0.266* 0.257* -0.736* -0.694* -0.311
(2.59) (2.48) (2.43) (-1.63) (-2.80) (-2.15) (2.56) (2.25) (2.14) (-2.49) (-2.39) (-1.72)
-0.339 -0.001 -0.082 -0.737 -1.962** -0.536 0.051 -0.034 -0.076 -0.959** -1.596** -0.241
(-0.69) (-0.01) (-0.54) (-1.47) (-3.19) (-1.70) (0.21) (-0.23) (-0.67) (-2.84) (-4.29) (-1.10)
1.597** 1.049** 0.827** 0.738 -0.370 -0.114 0.974** 0.751** 0.625** 0.044 -0.133 -0.031
(3.57) (3.67) (3.30) (1.87) (-0.89) (-0.58) (3.09) (3.84) (3.57) (0.22) (-0.51) (-0.27)
-0.038 0.019 0.026 -0.735* -1.362** -0.880** 0.018 0.005 0.016 -0.558** -1.099** -0.575**
(-0.12) (0.27) (0.37) (-2.59) (-4.45) (-4.49) (0.11) (0.11) (0.32) (-2.64) (-5.88) (-4.59)
0.452* 0.228** 0.194** -0.750** -0.478** -0.183 0.435** 0.180** 0.148** -0.718** -0.478** -0.163
(2.39) (3.49) (2.92) (-5.05) (-2.92) (-1.65) (2.74) (3.27) (2.63) (-4.45) (-3.03) (-1.56)
0.688** 0.352** 0.321** -0.643** -1.190** -0.486** 0.393** 0.212** 0.192** -0.573** -0.767** -0.257**
(3.38) (5.02) (4.84) (-3.42) (-5.30) (-3.28) (3.17) (4.33) (4.01) (-4.42) (-4.96) (-2.78)
1.017** 0.376** 0.333** -0.642** -1.188** -0.487** 0.603** 0.226** 0.199** -0.573** -0.766** -0.257**
(4.61) (5.20) (4.93) (-3.41) (-5.29) (-3.28) (4.49) (4.52) (4.10) (-4.41) (-4.95) (-2.78)
1.758* 0.477** 0.346* -1.516* -1.117* -1.813** 0.932* 0.279* 0.206* -1.123 -0.879* -0.852*
(2.30) (2.69) (2.39) (-2.09) (-2.08) (-4.07) (2.20) (2.33) (2.10) (-1.73) (-2.45) (-2.37)
1.758* 0.477** 0.346* -1.516* -1.117* -1.813** 0.932* 0.279* 0.206* -1.123 -0.879* -0.852*
(2.30) (2.69) (2.39) (-2.09) (-2.08) (-4.07) (2.20) (2.33) (2.10) (-1.73) (-2.45) (-2.37)
0.754** 0.310** 0.289** -0.329 -1.058** -0.400** 0.440** 0.189** 0.181** -0.354* -0.674** -0.216*
(3.62) (4.15) (3.86) (-1.67) (-4.56) (-2.90) (3.39) (3.61) (3.33) (-2.54) (-4.26) (-2.49)
0.787** 0.436** 0.370** -0.359 -1.032** -0.404* 0.438** 0.254** 0.218** -0.380** -0.667** -0.210*
(3.34) (5.10) (4.68) (-1.76) (-4.37) (-2.47) (3.03) (4.22) (3.86) (-2.69) (-4.03) (-2.01)
0.624** 0.425** 0.352** -0.532** -0.858** -0.258** 0.298** 0.263** 0.224** -0.383** -0.519** -0.132*
(4.13) (8.60) (7.75) (-5.05) (-7.00) (-3.24) (2.97) (7.18) (6.56) (-3.89) (-5.24) (-2.28)
0.801* 0.334** 0.240* -0.560 -1.290** -0.817** 0.496** 0.170* 0.116 -0.605** -0.940** -0.480**
(2.12) (2.90) (2.25) (-1.76) (-3.26) (-2.93) (2.89) (2.57) (1.83) (-2.61) (-4.08) (-2.88)
Panel M: Controlling for past skewness and excessive trading
Panel F: Controlling for gender
Panel K: Controlling for sample selection using the Heckman model
Panel G: Controlling for vehicle price
Panel J: Controlling for manager biological age
Panel I: Controlling for marital status
Panel L: Controlling for past risk seeking
Panel H: Controlling for the purchase price of the manager's house
Table X
Subsample Analyses, Alternative Explanations, and Robustness Tests
Dependent variable = RISK Dependent variable = IDIORISK
Panel E: Dependent variable = risk measured over the two-year period prior to car purchase
This table reports coefficient estimates from multivariate regressions on hedge fund risk. The dependent variables are RISK and IDIORISK. RISK is the
standard deviation of monthly hedge fund returns. IDIORISK is the standard deviation of monthly hedge fund residuals from the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven-factor model. RISK and IDIORISK are estimated over each nonoverlapping 24-month period after the vehicle purchase month. The
independent variables include the pro-sensation vehicle attributes SPORT, POWER, and TORQUE as well as the anti-sensation vehicle attributes
MINIVAN, SPACE, and SAFETY. SPORT is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for sports cars, where sports cars are vehicles with any of
the following body styles: two-door coupe, two-door convertible, and two-door hatchback. POWER is maximum horsepower in units of 100 bhp.
TORQUE is maximum torque in units of 100 pound-feet. MINIVAN is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for minivans, where minivans are
vehicles with any of the following body styles: sports van, passenger van, and extended passenger van. SPACE is passenger volume in units of 100
cubic feet. SAFETY is the IIHS average safety rating. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE), 
performance fee (PERFFEE), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE), fund age in years (AGE), redemption period in
months (REDEMPTION), and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE)). The controls also include past RETURN or ALPHA estimated over the prior 24-
month period, as well as strategy and year fixed effects. RETURN and ALPHA are monthly fund return and alpha, respectively. The coefficient
estimates on the independent variables that are not based on vehicle attributes are omitted for brevity. The t -statistics derived from robust standard
errors clustered by fund are in parentheses. The sample period is January 2004 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the
1% level.
Panel A: Manager does not co-invest personal capital
Panel B: Manager co-invests personal capital
Panel C: Funds with low manager total deltas
Panel D: Funds with high manager total deltas
